Chapter 28: The Third Case

Nuvem Sombria de Espionagem O Reino Azul Profundo 2323 words 2026-08-05 05:06:26

Chapter 28: The Third Case

Late February.

Xu Ruiyang had been granted investigative authority over four espionage cases. Although the American spy case was solved, he had no intention of acting on it; the Italian case was also resolved, leaving only the German and Soviet cases.

In reality, he only had one choice: the German espionage case. After all, he could hardly investigate Soviet intelligence operations.

The previous two cases had proven that his deductive approach to espionage was accurate. To evade Japanese surveillance, intelligence was being passed through third parties, and the source of that intelligence was likely the Ministry of Public Security.

However, every intelligence agency and every intelligence operative has a unique way of working. A successful method for one may not apply to all; thus, every case presented a brand-new challenge.

The current target was a German merchant named Fein, who had opened a foreign trading firm in Xinjing, specializing in representing Mercedes-Benz. The Security Bureau was convinced he was a German spy and had conducted extensive surveillance, yet they had never managed to find any concrete evidence.

"Ruiyang, we’ve been watching him for a week now and haven't found a single lead! The German Legation in Xinjing only opened on January 23rd, less than a month ago. This means someone has been in charge of intelligence operations in Xinjing long before that."

"We compared the photos of Fein's daily activities taken by the Security Bureau with those of suspicious individuals at the Ministry of Public Security, but found no matches. Could the Germans be setting up a smokescreen, using a Chinese national to handle the actual execution?" Tang Rongcai asked while drinking.

For the investigation into Fein, Tang Rongcai and Zhang Tianshun were using their old methods: photo comparison. They were cross-referencing the people seen interacting with the big spenders at the Ministry of Public Security against those seen with Fein, hoping to find a link.

Xu Ruiyang had become their greatest source of income. For the last assignment, they had only spent two days conducting surveillance and taking photos, yet each received a bonus of two hundred Manchukuo Yuan—not including the fifty Xu had given them upfront. With the constant supply of food and alcohol during their meetings, they lived like royalty and were more than happy to follow Xu Ruiyang’s lead.

The two had been commissioned to start watching the personnel at the Ministry of Public Security. Ge Baomin, the rickshaw puller, had been released and joined the investigation as an informant; he spent his days watching the entrance of the Ministry, equipped with a camera to photograph any suspicious targets.

They had spent several days closely monitoring individuals at the Ministry similar to Cheng Yankun, but discovered nothing. It seemed the methods used against the Italian Legation in Xinjing were not suited for dealing with German intelligence agents.

"What you’re saying is certainly possible. Japanese intelligence agencies monitor foreigners very strictly; their every move is recorded, and for them to contact an insider directly would be extremely dangerous for both parties."

"The reason we succeeded so quickly last time was that there was only one intermediary between them. What if both the Germans and the insider have their own separate intermediaries?"

"The only way forward now is to investigate from the source. We must fix our eyes on the people at the Ministry of Public Security; if they intend to pass intelligence, they will eventually exhibit abnormal behavior," Xu Ruiyang said.

Regarding these suspected spies, the Security Bureau would first impose tight surveillance, fail to make a breakthrough, and then let it lapse into routine monitoring. Once Xu took over, the previous work simply ceased.

In truth, the Foreign Affairs Anti-Espionage Division had many targets to track, and unless he filed a request for support, he had to rely on himself and his informants for surveillance and investigation.

"The Staff Department of the Ministry of Public Security has five divisions—the General Affairs Division, Military Division, Training Division, Investigation Division, and River Defense Division—totaling over two hundred people. Then there is the Minister’s Office, which also has a dedicated secretariat," Zhang Tianshun said, shaking his head.

Manchukuo currently maintained an army of over one hundred thousand. As the nominal military command structure, the Staff Department’s establishment was certainly large, and it included various well-connected individuals who were there to draw a salary rather than do any work.

The Minister of Public Security served as the nominal commander of all Manchukuo military branches. His office included secretaries and clerks. Any military action taken by the Manchukuo army required his signature for filing and archival purposes—a procedure that had to be followed, even if it was just a formality.

That was the problem: with so many people in the Ministry of Public Security, any one of them could be the culprit. Trying to track and vet them one by one was an enormous workload. Their team consisted of only four people; how long would that take?

"That is not how you investigate a case. The reason the Germans are developing an insider is to understand the overall strength of the Kwantung Army, as well as the military dynamics between the Kwantung Army and the Soviet Union. We will focus our investigation on the Military Division, the General Affairs Division, and the Secretariat."

"Kwantung Army operations often require the cooperation of the Manchukuo army. Military movement orders are sent to the Military Division, while the General Affairs Division handles the logistics. They only receive partial information. The Minister’s Secretariat would also need to know such information, likely in the form of a brief application report. There is no need to notify the other divisions."

"We will limit our investigation to these two divisions and one office. Step one: identify those who can directly access military intelligence—usually the heads of the Military Division, senior staff officers, the director of the archives, the clerks who copy documents, and the secretaries in the Minister’s office. Step two: investigate those with indirect access, including ordinary staff officers, clerks, and the head and staff of the General Affairs Division," Xu Ruiyang said with a smile.

Military security measures are naturally very strict. The Japanese are not fools; they inevitably have supervisors within the Ministry of Public Security, such as the military advisors assigned to those divisions, who perform exactly that function.

To put it simply, the number of people who have access to military intelligence is limited. Xu Ruiyang leaned toward the staff officers and the clerks who transcribed the documents. As for the division-level leaders and secretaries, the possibility of them leaking information was very low, as they were also the primary objects of Japanese scrutiny.

As for the director of the archives—the confidential records room—he certainly had access to classified files. He held the keys to the safe, but opening it was difficult. The archives were guarded twenty-four hours a day, and not by just one person. There were likely Japanese informants among them, making the director an unlikely culprit.

"If we follow your criteria, the scope of the investigation shrinks significantly. Just tell us how to arrange it, and we will do as you say!" Tang Rongcai said.

"First, check their background information, expanding to their family, relatives, and social circles. Then, investigate their daily behavior. Categorize it into three types: frequent outings, scheduled outings or scheduled visitors at home, and visits to fixed locations."

"I will apply to pull the files of everyone in the Staff Department and the Minister’s Office of the Ministry of Public Security. These individuals have all undergone strict vetting. Your task is to find out who they frequently associate with, then gather photos of all their social contacts and conduct a new comparison, starting with the Military Division," Xu Ruiyang concluded.